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1Sherilyn MacGregor is Ph.D. graduate of York University’s Faculty of 
Environmental Studies and is currently a SSHRC postdoctoral fellow at the 
Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy at Lancaster 
University in the United Kingdom. rom Ecological Crisis to Environmental Culture 
n the spring of 2001, there was an outbreak of foot and mouth disease 
n the north of England. The UK government, desperate to control the 
risis and stop the spread, forced farmers to round up their mostly 
ealthy animals, shoot them one by one, burn their corpses and then 
ulldoze them into open pits. Supervised by the Department of 
nvironment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and assisted by the 
ilitary, 6.5 million animals from 10,000 farms were slaughtered over a 
ix month period. From the window by the desk where I sit, black 
moke from the pyres could have been seen wafting over the lush green 
ills of the Lake District. While I am grateful that I was not living in 
ngland when this tragedy occurred, being here now and listening to 
tories of people who lived through it has been a powerful catalyst for 
hinking about the kind of logic that might underpin, and be used to 
ustify, such a tragic event.  
n her latest book, Australian environmental and ecofeminist 
hilosopher Val Plumwood offers an analytic framework useful for 
nderstanding why events like these make perfect sense in a culture that 
as no place for the “soft” and emotional sphere of ethics in the hard-
osed world of economic decision-making. In a culture that 
ystematically commodifies animals and the rest of nature (note the 
onflation of food and environment, with no mention of animals, in the 
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above-named UK department), it is only rational that a government 
should deem it necessary to sacrifice the lives of millions of healthy 
animals for the sake of an industrial sector upon which the national 
economy depends. Perhaps it is the entrenchment of the dominant 
understanding of rationality that made it possible for the extermination 
program to be carried out. Viewed through Plumwood’s framework, 
however, the event in question may have been rational in the 
hegemonic sense of the term (as rational decisions are made with the 
head not the heart) but it was utterly irrational in ecological terms.  
Plumwood’s central argument is that the environmental crisis is best 
understood as a crisis of reason, the inevitable product of a culture that 
has been led by a misguided understanding of reason and rationality. It 
is the corresponding failure to situate human society ecologically and to 
think about the non-human world in an ethical way that must be 
overcome. What we need, she aims to show, is to replace the now 
dominant forms of instrumental rationality with ecological rationality as 
part of a larger project of creating an environmental culture. An 
important step in this process is to repair the dualistic separation of 
male-coded rationalism and prudence and female-coded emotion and 
ethics. Such reworking would entail the rejection of “monological, 
hierarchical, and mechanistic models” in favour of “more mutual, 
communicative and responsive ones” (12) that would lead ultimately to 
ethical interspecies partnerships and a critical solidarity with nature. 
In the first two chapters of the book, Plumwood presents a 
thoroughgoing critique of what she calls the “sado-dispassionate” 
culture of rationalism in the west, complete with a standard listing of 
eco-crimes committed in its name. She argues that dangerous forms of 
“ecological denial” pervade most spheres of contemporary life. The 
most dangerous of these denials is the denial of the embodied nature of 
human beings, which has brought with it the denial of human 
dependency on others (human and non-human) and on biophysical 
processes. It is a central insight of ecofeminism that the masculinist 
myth of independence and the celebration of the uniquely rational 
human mind have brought with them the devaluation of all things 
associated with the feminine and the body. Like the unpaid and 
underpaid life-sustaining work of women and colonized people, the 
contributions of the natural world to human existence is externalized in 
dominant political-economic-technoscientific systems. What is 
externalized is assumed-yet-denied; that which is objectified and hidden 
requires neither protection nor moral consideration. Plumwood first 
presented this analysis in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (1993). 
Here she expands it to fit both new globalizing contexts and her 
heightened philosophical interest in questions of rationality.  
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Unlike some in the feminist and ecology movements, Plumwood does 
not give up on rationality, indeed she sees great merit in the concept. 
Although in accepted definitions of rationality (i.e., instrumental 
rationality) something is considered rational if the best means are used 
to achieve the desired ends, this does not mean that the ends are 
themselves rational. The desired ends could be insane, says Plumwood, 
and, looking around at the mess made in the name of economic 
rationality, they most certainly are. It is not rationality as a concept that 
is to blame but rather the way it has been used by an elite group of 
individuals in the quest for profit and power. Their quest has been 
facilitated by a system that keeps them remote from and oblivious to the 
consequences of their actions. Free trade is effectively free of 
responsibility; the global market is an ethics-free zone. Global 
capitalism is extremely ecologically irrational because its raison d’étre 
is to use up and contaminate the material conditions of its own 
existence. “If the world of nature dies, Wall Street dies too” (236). In 
contrast, the kinds of reason and rationality that Plumwood wishes to 
restore and put “at the service of liberation” (14) are those that are 
careful and critical, responsible and ethical. She believes that such 
reorientation would make possible the two historic tasks necessary for 
the creation of an environmental culture: (re)situating humans in 
ecological terms and (re)casting the non-human world in ethical terms. 
Whereas the contemporary global capitialist-imperialist-masculinist-
speciesist culture is in the process of destroying life on earth, an 
environmental culture would be ecologically rational in that it would 
make survival possible. 
The first task involves accepting that, as embodied and ecological 
beings, humans are dependent on nature. If we recognize ourselves to 
be “dependent rational animals” (I’ll quote Alistair McIntyre here even 
if Plumwood does not) then we will make the kind of choices that are 
compatible with the needs of biological systems that support us. 
Drawing on John Dryzek’s concept of ecological rationality, Plumwood 
argues that we need to develop the kind of self-critical reason that 
allows us to see the lack of fit between our survival aims and the 
choices and actions that are sanctioned in western civilization. It will 
then no longer be possible to stand aside and accept that some groups in 
society are able to purchase comfortable remoteness while others are 
forced to live with the effects of their environmental and social 
irresponsibility. Here Plumwood draws on the growing environmental 
justice literature to highlight the connections between social inequality 
and ecological irrationality occasioned by, among other things, the 
geographical distancing of the perpetrators of eco-harms from their 
physical effects. For example, consumers in the affluent north can enjoy 
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commodities extracted from southern rainforests while remaining 
remote from the forest fires, soil erosion, and diseases that are 
inevitable externalities of the industry. The foot and mouth crisis was 
(mis)handled by bureaucrats in London while powerless and 
traumatized farming families struggled to follow their orders in 
Cumbria. Plumwood claims that the way to bring about an end to the 
“epistemic remoteness” of the privileged is to move toward a form of 
deliberative or communicative democracy where everyone has an equal 
opportunity to speak. But this highly idealized, ecological interpretation 
of democracy—shared by a growing number of environmental 
thinkers—lacks concrete suggestions for how such a system might be 
established, let alone how it might work in practice. I am left 
wondering: how would more people around the decision-making table 
have changed the fate of the sheep? Although Plumwood wants to 
regard animals as communicative beings, she says little about how they 
ought to be included in an ecological democracy, let alone what ought 
to happen when the interests of human and non-human are in conflict. 
The second task, recasting the non-human world in ethical terms, is 
where Plumwood provides her most interesting recommendations for 
eco-cultural transformation. She wants us to adopt what she calls 
“partnership ethics” that fundamentally change the kind of relations 
human beings have with the more-than-human world. Plumwood sets 
this vision apart from other eco-philosophical perspectives that have 
purported to extend ethical consideration to the non-human. She wishes 
to avoid the mistakes they have made. For her, the point is not to extend 
the boundaries of ethical considerability but to open up dialogical 
spaces in which to create ethical and egalitarian interspecies 
communication. She quite rightly points out that none of the existing 
approaches (i.e., Kantian, Utilitarian, and Rights-based environmental 
ethics and deep ecology) has succeeded in developing the kind of non-
instrumental, non-anthropocentric ethic that is needed because they fail 
to think of nature as an agent in its own right. They are thus unable to 
think in terms of an equal partnership with nature. 
Although some have characterized her as being a critic of deep ecology, 
Plumwood gives credit where credit is due in this book and offers some 
constructive criticisms that build on its strengths. She commends Arne 
Naess and his followers for providing an activist-inspired account of 
environmental ethics that moves away from conventional forms of 
extensionism and instrumentalism and towards a greater sense of 
solidarity with, even reverence for, nature. Yet she takes issue with 
deep ecology for giving ethical consideration to the entire non-human 
world on the basis of human identification with nature in a way that 
effectively denies it its uniqueness and independence as an agent. What 
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she calls “environmental unity” approaches to ethics are 
problematically apolitical in so far as they cover over diversity and 
leave no room for a separate identity for nature. Here she makes a 
distinctively feminist critique of the Lockean concept of property to 
make the point that unity accounts are a form of “coverture” similar to 
the way women have been treated in marriage. According to 
Plumwood, this vision of unity is another, albeit subtle, form of 
anthropocentrism: it equates nature’s interests with those of human 
beings rather than describing a negotiated relationship between two 
separate-yet-equal-and-interdependent partners. 
It is impossible to think of the more-than-human world as a partner if at 
the same time we treat aspects of it as commodities. Plumwood makes 
this point in order to problematize the tendency in deep ecological 
approaches to say more about the need for changes in individual 
consciousness than the necessity for institutional changes, especially to 
the capitalist economy. What she calls for instead is an eco-socialist 
deep ecology, which radically challenges the concept of private 
property (214). With respect to treating animals as a commodity (i.e., as 
meat)—which is at the heart of the foot and mouth crisis—Plumwood 
would replace an animal-rights stance with one based in human kinship 
with beings who have mind, intention, and communicative abilities that 
at the same time transcends the human/nature dualism by recognizing 
that all living things (human beings included) are food for other living 
things. Thus, the total abstention from consuming animals is not the 
only possible ethical response (she comes close to calling it unnatural) 
and it will not succeed in challenging the dominant rationalist economic 
system. Neither, Plumwood argues, will personal conversion to ethical 
veganism or vegetarianism, adopted by many deep ecologists, lead to 
the kind of political alliances (e.g., between farmers, consumers, and 
animal-rights and anti-capitalist activists) that will be able to confront 
the systemic causes of animal exploitation and suffering. What is 
needed, she says, is an end to the hyper-separation of reason and 
emotion, use and respect, meat animal from pet animal—those moral 
dualisms that make factory farming acceptable in most places in the 
world.  
Plumwood’s critical analysis of the ecological crisis of reason cuts 
through many debates in environmental thought and helps to make 
theoretical sense of some of our most dire ecological problems. I can 
recommend it as important reading for all those interested in how 
environmental philosophy might respond to contemporary issues of 
globalization and enduring injustice. However, I read the book with the 
horrific foot-and-mouth disease tragedy at the forefront of my mind and 
so, in spite of her commendable theorizing, I am left wondering how 
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her proposed move toward partnership ethics helps us to imagine a 
different way of handling that particular crisis. It somehow seems 
unsatisfactory to say that in an environmental culture based on a 
respectful and communicative relationship between humans, animals, 
and the rest of the non-human world, such a crisis would never have 
occurred in the first place. How will we get there and what should we 
do in the meantime? Her call to rethink farming as a non-commodity 
activity based on inter-species equity is unlikely to make sense to many 
farmers. I suspect that if we were to apply Plumwood’s partnership 
ethics to the real situation of the Cumbrian farmers (marginalized in an 
economy desperate to globalize) who had to kill all the sheep and cattle 
(with whom their families have had a relationship for generations) on 
their land (much of which is common property), we would find that it 
not only is founded on some unhelpful generalizations about “western 
culture” but also that it is unable to address the myriad conflicts and 
complications that it entailed. I think the book is important contribution 
to environmental philosophy, but for a philosophical treatise to be able 
to inspire cultural change it needs to show how it can help us make 
better choices on the ground and in the field, here and now.  
 
Volume 19, Number 3 115
